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VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE FOSTERING OVERENFORCEMENT 
AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION OF THE FCPA 
Karen E. Woody* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Peter Reilly’s article1 challenges the notion that voluntary 
disclosure of potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations 
to the government is always the best course of action for a company. In a 
world where whistleblowers can receive a bounty for information 
provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 self-
reporting is a critical, high-pressure decision that each company must 
undertake when faced with potential FCPA liability.  
This Article takes a broader look at the FCPA landscape, focusing on 
SEC enforcement, in parallel to the Department of Justice (DOJ) focus 
that Professor Reilly undertakes in his Article. Specifically, this Article 
buttresses Professor Reilly’s argument by pointing out that the SEC has 
become an increasingly prosecutorial agency that uses disgorgement as a 
punitive measure, and enjoys the ability to be both prosecutor and judge 
in a settlement-driven landscape. In practicality, this means the scales are 
tipped in the government’s favor, making the decision whether to 
voluntarily disclose even murkier.  
I.  OVERENFORCEMENT AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION 
As Professor Reilly points out in his Article, the FCPA was not an oft-
charged statute until the 2000s.3 Specifically, from its enactment in 1977 
until 2001, the SEC brought only nine enforcement actions under the 
FCPA.4 Since those original cases, the FCPA “industry,” which includes 
both regulators and defense counsel, has enjoyed a boom that, to date, has 
not waned. 
The rise of enforcement actions, often settled with deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) 
as Professor Reilly points out, shows that the statute is now both 
overenforced and overcriminalized.5  
                                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of 
Business.  
 1. Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Bribery 
Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683 (2015). 
 2. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Whistleblower Program Surpasses 
$100 Million in Awards (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-173.html. 
 3. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1692. 
 4. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last updated Oct. 5, 2016).  
 5. See Karen E. Woody, No Smoke and No Fire: The Rise of Internal Controls Absent 
Anti-Bribery Violations in FCPA Enforcement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).  
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Overenforcement occurs when a violator of a legal rule suffers 
excessive harm due to the actual implementation of the rule.6 Excessive 
harm in the case of overenforcement is harm that is greater than what is 
required for optimal deterrence.7 Likewise, overcriminalization is 
broadly defined as “the overuse and misuse of the [ ] law to punish 
conduct traditionally deemed morally blameless.”8 Overcriminalization 
results in enforcement of laws that cover “more conduct than anyone 
really wishes to punish.”9 Although SEC enforcement actions are, by 
definition and institutional design, civil proceedings, the concept of 
overcriminalization is equally applicable with respect to civil SEC 
enforcement actions as it is to criminal actions. I contend that 
overcriminalization is manifested in three areas. First, the SEC as an 
agency, and certainly when investigating potential FCPA violations, has 
become much more of a prosecutorial institution than a remedial one. 
Second, the use of disgorgement as a punitive measure rather than a 
remedial one is a sign of overciminalization in the sentencing stage. 
Third, there is a substantial lack of judicial precedent within the common 
law regarding enforcement of the internal controls provision, rendering 
the SEC (and DOJ) both prosecutor and judge during settlement 
negotiations. This section will explore these three manifestations of 
overcriminalization, resulting in zealous overenforcement of the statute. 
All of this factors into a company’s decision regarding voluntary 
disclosure, but paints with broader strokes the landscape in which a 
company has to make that decision. 
A.  The Evolution of the SEC’s Enforcement Division into Prosecutorial 
Body 
In recent history, the Enforcement Division of the SEC has swallowed 
up the agency, both in resources/manpower and in setting the tone of the 
agency.10 It is widely seen as the “police force” for the SEC.11 Indeed, the 
SEC Chair, Mary Jo White, a former prosecutor, underscored that 
prosecutorial tone when she adopted her “no broken windows” policy for 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744 
(2005).  
 7. Id.  
 8. Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 
1197, 1198 (2015) (quoting Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: 
The Proper and Improper Use of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745 (2014)).  
 9. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
507 (2001). 
 10. Cf. Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2143–44 (2015).  
 11. How the SEC’s Enforcement Division is Responding to Cybersecurity Challenges, 
MORNINGSTAR (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.morningstar.com/news/benzinga/BenzBZW_
8588833/how-the-secs-enforcement-division-is-responding-to-cybersecurity-challenges.html.  
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the agency.12 Yet, the SEC is not an arm of the Department of Justice. 
This fact is lost on most corporate officers who face the same level of 
investigation and threat of punishment regardless of whether it is the SEC 
or DOJ that comes calling. In short, the Enforcement Division has 
rendered the SEC an agency with overwhelming “police power,” at the 
expense of its role focusing on guidance and remedial measures to keep 
corporations in line.  
Enforcement of the FCPA is no different; the drastically increasing 
fines and prosecutions for violations of the FCPA since 2000 has 
arguably made the FCPA one of the “hottest” areas in the Enforcement 
Division.13 Since 2010, the SEC has an FCPA unit within the Division of 
Enforcement.14 Contrary to the organizational structure and design of the 
agency, the Enforcement Division is regulating and influencing corporate 
behavior through punishment, rather than providing agency guidance 
through other means.15  
The hard-charging enforcement of all of the Act’s provisions is not in 
line with the initial intent of the Act. In a speech given in 1981 that 
manifested some of the initial and original intent of the statute, the then-
Chairman of the SEC Harold Williams stated the following about the 
FCPA in a speech to the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants: 
The Act’s eventual success or failure will, therefore, depend 
primarily upon business’s response. The Commission’s 
obligation, in turn, is to provide a regulatory environment in 
which the private sector can address these issues 
meaningfully and creatively. In this regard, we must 
encourage public companies to develop innovative records 
and control systems, to modify and improve them as 
circumstances change, and to correct recordkeeping errors 
when they occur without a chilling fear of penalty or 
inference that a violation of the Act is involved.16 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Securities Enforcement 
Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872100 (citing 
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Window, THE ATLANTIC (March 1982), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/).  
 13. Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1289 (2015).  
 14. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs 
and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010) 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm.  
 15. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The 
Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (1998) (describing how the SEC 
frequently makes law through enforcement cases rather than through rulemaking).  
 16. Harold M. Williams, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Accounting 
Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Analysis (Jan. 13, 1981), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/011381williams.pdf. 
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The notion of “encouraging” companies and “correcting errors” 
without “fear of penalty” is more in line with the guiding principles of 
other departments in the agency rather than the “broken windows” 
policies of the Enforcement Division. For example, the Office of 
Compliance, Inspection and Examinations (“OCIE”) regularly inspects 
registered entities, yet does so without playing “gotcha” with the 
regulated entities.17 The same can be said in the context of voluntary 
disclosure; that is, when the government is hard-charging and seemingly 
intent on extracting large fines and individual liability, voluntary 
disclosure does not look as appealing as it may have in a more “remedial” 
regime at the SEC.  
B.  The Problem with Disgorgement 
The trend in enforcement actions by the DOJ, as described by 
Professor Reilly,18 parallels the uptick in large settlement amounts 
extracted by the SEC that consist entirely of disgorgement and 
prejudgment interest without any finding of a violation of the anti-bribery 
provisions. This type of fine is oft-termed “no-charged bribery 
disgorgement.”19 These fines represent a punitive settlement rather than 
an equitable one. A former associate director of the SEC’s Enforcement 
Division summarized this concept by stating:  
[S]ettlements invoking disgorgement but charging no 
primary anti-bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as 
disgorgement is predicated on the common-sense notion that 
an actual, jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to 
procure the revenue identified by the SEC in its 
complaint. . . . Given the bedrock principle that a court’s 
equitable power to order such disgorgement only goes as far 
as the scope of the violation, it is difficult to determine how 
a court could lawfully allow disgorgement of profits for 
uncharged violations without the remedy crossing into the 
line of “punishment” for the violations actually charged.20  
In order to obtain disgorgement, the government needs to prove a 
causal link between the wrongdoing and the unjust enrichment.21 In the 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See Andrew Bowden, Dir., SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, 
People Handling Other Peoples’ Money (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541260300. 
 18. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1692. 
 19. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Why You Should Be Alarmed by the ADM FCPA Enforcement 
Action, 9 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 58, 61 (2014).  
 20. Paul Berger, Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs? “Disgorgement” in Internal 
Controls and Books and Records Cases, 3 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA UPDATE 1, 2–4 
(2011) (footnotes omitted).  
 21. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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case of no-charged bribery disgorgement, there typically is not any direct 
link between profits and allegations of misconduct, rendering the fines 
associated with no-charged bribery cases punitive in nature. The FCPA22 
contains very specific guidelines and penalties for violations of both the 
anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the Act.23 Fines imposed for 
bribery are not part of the SEC’s § 21(d) fining authority,24 but were 
included into the Exchange Act as part of the 1988 Amendments to the 
FCPA.25 
Disgorgement, however, is not included in the statute, nor is it even 
mentioned in the original House or Senate reports of 1977, the discussion 
regarding its amendments, or the 1981 U.S. General Accounting Office 
Report.26 The first use of disgorgement in the settlement of an FCPA 
action was in 2004, in the case of SEC v. ABB Ltd.27 Since that time, the 
SEC has sought disgorgement “in virtually every FCPA enforcement 
action it has brought.”28 Accordingly, the imposed fines give the 
impression the company received ill-gotten gains. Yet, a cursory look at 
recent SEC enforcement actions involving disgorgement makes clear the 
company received no ill-gotten gains as a result of bribery.  
By definition, disgorgement should not be a punitive remedy. It 
should be used to separate the bad actor from any ill-gotten gains. 
However, the use of disgorgement in FCPA enforcement actions seems 
to serve the purposes of both deterrence and retribution: decidedly 
punitive goals. This is problematic when there are no ill-gotten gains 
under the meaning of the statute; that is, there has not be any contract or 
business retained or obtained through the use of bribes to foreign 
officials, nor has there been any illegal accounting methods to hide those 
bribes. To punish a company for this conduct flies in the face of both the 
purpose of the statute and the remedial options available to the 
government when pursuing these allegations. 
Consider this problem of disgorgement in the context of voluntary 
disclosure, and in the context of Professor Reilly’s significant analysis. 
Although Professor Reilly discussed recent cases in terms of DOJ fines 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (2012)). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g); 78dd-3(e); 78ff (2012). 
 24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78pp (2012)). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2012).  
 26. See David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of 
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, 
and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 497 (2009).  
 27. No. 1:04CV1141, 2009 WL 2129216 (D. D.C. 2010). ABB disgorged $5.9 million to 
settle books and records and internal controls violations. Id.  
 28. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 907, 982 (2010) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
294 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 67 
 
as they related to the Sentencing Guidelines,29 the argument is both 
analogous and valid. Voluntary disclosure of potential FCPA violations, 
even where no ill gotten gains were had, nevertheless can result in 
significant disgorgement remedies, and must be considered in the overall 
calculus of whether to voluntarily disclose or not.  
C.  Arbitrariness in Enforcement and Settlements  
Professor Reilly astutely notes that companies need specific and 
detailed guidance and direction regarding how to stay in compliance with 
the FCPA.30 In turn, companies need to create and engage a robust 
compliance program in order to detect and prevent FCPA violations. 
Despite a seemingly clear statutory mandate for establishing an internal 
controls regime, there is a fair amount of gray area in terms of what 
constitutes adequate internal controls and compliance procedures. This 
concept was captured in 1983, when a federal district court stated, “[t]he 
main problem with the internal accounting controls provision of the 
FCPA is that there are no specific standards by which to evaluate the 
sufficiency of controls; any evaluation is inevitably a highly subjective 
process in which knowledgeable individuals can arrive at totally different 
conclusions.”31  
Few courts have ruled on FCPA internal control violations because 
most defendants settle.  There is accordingly little judicial precedent 
surrounding compliance programs. The downside to looking merely to 
DOJ and SEC settlement agreements for legal standards regarding 
compliance programs is that the settlement agreements are created by 
prosecutors without judicial oversight.32 In practicality, the SEC acts as 
both prosecutor and judge, without much regard toward previous 
settlements.  
As such, SEC enforcement attorneys are able to shape the entire 
landscape of the statutory enforcement.33 As the ultimate decision-
makers,  they decide what actions constitute a violation of the code,  
whether to investigate, whether to bring an enforcement action, and 
whether and for what amount to settle the action.34 All of this occurs 
without judicial review, up until acceptance of the settlement action by 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1700–10. 
 30. Id. at 1700.  
 31. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
 32. See Peter J. Henning, Appeals Court Ruling in S.E.C. Case Will Curb Judicial Power 
over Settlements, DEALBOOK (June 4, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/appeals-
court-ruling-in-s-e-c-case-will-curb-judicial-power-over-settlements/?_r=0. 
 33. See David Hess, Combating Corruption Through Corporate Transparency: Using 
Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 42, 62–63 (2012).  
 34. See generally Minzner, supra note 10 (outlining the vast discretion afforded to 
enforcing agencies when making charging decisions). 
2016] VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 295 
 
the court. The ability to cherry-pick cases and the arbitrary nature of 
settlement agreements without any precedential value results in a lack of 
checks and balances—and, arguably, due process—for a corporate 
defendant unwilling to take its chances in court for any number of 
reasons. Similarly, a corporate defendant also is less likely to “raise its 
hand” and voluntarily disclose FCPA violations when the parameters for 
compliance and the existence of a robust internal controls systems seem 
to be moving targets.  
II.  THE RESULT OF OVERENFORCEMENT: OVERCOMPLIANCE AND 
POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 
Overcriminalization and overenforcement of the FCPA have created 
a necessary culture of compliance among many large issuers. However, 
neither the DOJ nor the SEC have explicitly stated what a model 
compliance program must contain to satisfy the internal controls 
requirement. As such, the critical decision regarding whether to 
voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations is made even trickier. 
Both the DOJ and the SEC have, however, indicated when companies 
have satisfied or failed to satisfy the standard through their settlement 
decisions and non-prosecution agreements. However, the arbitrariness in 
the enforcement of the FCPA results in a real risk of overcompliance, as 
vast resources are spent on compliance systems that may be either 
insufficient in the eyes of the regulators, or worse, wholly ineffective.  
In fact, a growing body of evidence indicates that internal 
compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within 
firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that 
provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability. 
. . . This leads to two potential problems: (1) an under-
deterrence of corporate misconduct, and (2) a proliferation 
of costly—but arguably ineffective—internal compliance 
structures.35 
Compliance is very forward-looking in its risk-assessments and 
structures. However, compliance systems are informed by the most recent 
regulatory actions. As such, they are inherently reactive to regulatory 
action. In this way, compliance systems may be a house of cards doomed 
to fail, because those who skirt compliance measures do so in continually 
novel ways.  The DOJ and SEC have been reluctant to define the exact 
content of an FCPA compliance program, because they want companies 
to continuously improve their compliance programs when their programs 
are either found to be ineffective or the industry adopts better standards. 
For example, in the DOJ’s non-prosecution agreement with IAP 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003). 
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Worldwide Services, Inc., the DOJ settled without prosecution partly 
because IAP promised to take remedial compliance measures.36  These 
measures included conducting periodic reviews and testing of anti-
corruption measures and policies in order to maintain effectiveness and 
improve with recent developments.37 By requiring such measures, it is 
difficult to establish a definitive program that will satisfy the internal 
controls requirement—a compliance program deemed effective and 
sufficient today may be found to be ineffective or outdated in the future, 
particularly if a company falls behind changing standards for compliance 
within its field. 
Compliance, in addition to voluntary disclosure, is a corporate cost-
benefit exercise. 
Companies may be willing to enter into such settlements—
particularly because, in the absence of a parallel DOJ action, 
they need not make any factual admissions (due to the 
“neither admit nor deny” nature of SEC settlements in such 
circumstances), and the cost of a settlement is often lower 
than continuing investigative and representative costs. But 
such settlements can have severe, unintended consequences. 
Perhaps most significantly, these settlements can lead other 
companies to misdirect their scarce compliance resources.38 
As such, compliance professionals and counsel must continually 
change guidelines, but without the benefit of “hard” precedent. Instead, 
they rely on the “soft” precedent of settlement agreements, as well as 
increasingly stricter standards for internal controls measures, and a 
playing field that is decidedly a home-court advantage for the regulators. 
Of course, the question of how robust to make one’s compliance program 
is directly analogous to the decision regarding whether to voluntarily 
disclose. As Professor Reilly shows, that decision is not a clear-cut line, 
and in many cases, voluntary disclosure is not worth the corporate costs. 
The risk inherent in voluntary disclosure, therefore, increases 
exponentially when compliance is not defined. Similarly, extending 
corporate resources to buttress robust corporate compliance programs 
may be throwing money into the wind.  
                                                                                                                     
 36.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, IAP Worldwide Services Inc. Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Investigation (June 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iap-worldwide-
services-inc-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation. 
 37. Id. 
 38. William J. Stuckwisch & Matthew J. Alexander, The FCPA’s Internal Controls 
Provision: Is Oracle an Oracle for the Future of SEC Enforcement?, 28 CRIM. JUST. 10, 15 (2013).  
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CONCLUSION 
The FCPA is a complex and intriguing statute, the enforcement of 
which has evolved drastically since its passage in 1977. Recent 
enforcement actions have put the spotlight on the benefits and costs of 
voluntary disclosure. Professor Reilly makes a significant contribution to 
the literature by analyzing the real risks in voluntary disclosure, as 
evidenced by a number of recent DOJ cases. In a broader sense, the real 
danger lurking in FCPA enforcement is overenforcement and 
overcriminalization of the statute. Just as a lack of benefit for voluntary 
disclosure shows, overenforcement and overcriminalization have a 
negative deterrent effective, and likely will do more harm than good in 
terms fulfilling the statutory purpose of eradicating foreign bribery, and 
in ensuring companies are undertaking reasonable steps to comply with 
the statute and establish robust internal controls.  
